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Common  wisdom  dictates  that increased  expo-  liberalization  does  not necessarily  improve
sure to global  markets  increases  the elasticity  of  productivity,  but their  flndings  are not strong
demand  perceived  by domestic  producers,  which  enough  to warrant  strong  conclusions.
in tum shifts production  toward  larger, more
efficient  plants.  Rationalization  of production  is  *  The results  depend  greatly on  whether
more  pronounced  when there  are few barriers  to  barriers  to finns'  entry and exit  are high or low.
entry  and exit of  firms, because  inefficiently  The effects  of changing  output  levels,  import  and
small  plants  are induced  to shut down.  export  shares,  and  effective  protection  rates are
systematically  moderated  by the possibility  of
Simulation  models  support  the perceived  easy entry or exit.  It could  be that output  adjust-
wisdom  that liberalization  of imperfectly  com-  ment by incumbent  plants  has less of a role when
petitive  industries  in developing  countries  results  the number  of plants  adjusts  to shifts in demand.
in larger  plants  and more efficiency.  But  there is  Or it could  mean that high  tumover  reflects
little  microeconometric  evidence  to confirm  the  competitive  pressure  and  reduces  the marginal
adjustment  mechaniisms  these models  assume.  impact  of foreign  competition  on market  struc-
ture.
To see if these effects  could  be confirmed,
Roberts  and Tybout  examined  annual  plant data  *  Long-run  and  short-run  correlations  of trade
from  Chile and Colombia,  using a simple model  regimes  and distribution  of plant  size are quite
that  summarizes  some  effects  of trade exposure  different.  Slhort-run correlations  associate
on producer  size and  productive  efficiency.  exports  with relatively  large plants;  long-run
They  found  thal:  correlations  associate  exports  with  relatively
small plants.  Roberts  and Tybout  suggest
Increased  exposure  to import competition  caution  in basing  policy  decisions  on either
appears  to clearly  reduce  the  size of all plants in  finding.
both the short  run and  (especially)  the  long run.
The popular  belief  that trade  liberalization  will  These  findings  cast doubt  on the mecha-
increase  average  plant size in import-compeling  nisms linking  trade,  planl  size,  and productivity
sectors  is not supported  by recent  Chlilean and  in recent  analytical  and  simulation  studies.
Colombian  experience.  This may  mean that
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Several reasons are often cited why exposure to foreign competition
should increase plant size and productivity in less developed countries
(LDCs).  First, ioreign competition reduces the market power that domestic
producers may derive from scale economies, rationed credit markets, or
institutional  constraints.  Consequently, reductions in protection should
expand output among these prccucers and allow better exploitation of scale
economies.  Similarly, when competitive discipline is absent, the resultant
cushion of  monopoly profits may allow inefficiently small, wasteful domestic
firms to survive.  Finally, even if profits are competed away through entry
or the threat of entry, limited domestic demand can lead to inefficiently
small-scale production in markets for differentiated products, where
Chamberlinian competition prevails.
These positive effects of trade exposure are widely held to apply, both
in developing and in industrialized  economies.  Nonetheless, analytical models
show that they need not obtain.  Whether trade liberalization improves
efficiency depends criticallv on the distribution  of output adjustments across
plants with diff?ring unit costs (Rodrik, 1988a).  This depends, in turn, on
factor intensities, the pattern of demand shifts, the nature of competition,
and the extent to which entry and exit are possible (e.g.,  Buffie and Spiller,
1986; Brown, 1989).  When technology  and innovation are endogenous, further
ambiguities result (Rodrik,  1988b).2
Simulation  models  support  the  received  wisdom  that,  in LDCs,
liberalization  of imperfectly  competitive  industries  results  in  larger  plants
and  higher  efficiency  (Condon  and  de  Melo,  1986;  Devarajan  and  Rodrik,  1988.
1989;  de Melo  and  Roland-Holst,  forthcoming). Disturbingly,  however,  there
is  very littie  micro-econometric  evidence  confirming  the  adjustment  mechanisms
that  these  models  assume. For  example,  Bhagwati  (1988)  concludes: "Although
the  arguments  for  the  success  of the [outward-oriented  development  scrategies]
based  on economies  of scale  and  X-efficiency  are  plausible,  empirical  support
for  them  is  not  available."  Pack (1989)  goes  furthe.,  climing that  the  link
between  trade  liberalization  and  productivity  growth  has  not  been established
at all.'
Given  the  lack  of direct  evidence  regarding  industrial  adjustment  in
response  to trade  liberalization,  this  paper  tackles  some  very  basic
questions. Specifically,  in  LDCs,  how is  trade  orientation  correlated  with
the  size  distribution  of plants  and  with  plant-level  labor  productivity?  We
begin  with a simple  model  that  summarizes  some  effects  of trade  exposure  on
producer  size  and  productive  efficiency  that  have  been  stressed  in the  recent
analytical  and  simulation  literature.  We then  examine  annual  plant-level
data  from  Chile  and  Colombia  to  determine  whether  these  effects  can  be
confirmed.
The  empirical  results  indicate  that,  over  the  long  run,  higher  trade
exposure  is  corre'.ated  with smaller  plant  sizes,  controlling  for  industry  and
country  effects. However,  the  mix  of  high  versus  low  productivity  plants  is
not  strongly  associated  with trade  exposure. Both  of these  findings  cast
doubt  on the  mec'anisms  linking  trade,  plant  size,  and  productivity  in  a
number  of recent  analytical  and  simulation  studies.3
II.  THEORIES  LINKING  TRADE  REGIME  AND SIZE  RATIONALIZATION
A.  The  Analytics  of Site  Rationalization  Under  Imperfect  Competition
To motivate  our  empirical  work,  we begin  with an  expository  model  that
generates  several  predictions  familiar  from  the  trade  and  development
literature.2  First,  assume  that  within  each industry,  domestically  produced
goods  are  perfect  substitutes,  and  domestic  firms  are  Cournot  quantity
competitors  vis a  vis  one  another.  Also,  let  the  domestic  product  be an
imperfect  substitute  for  imports,  so that  the  demand  curve  faced  by domesi'.c
producers  may  be written  as P  - P(Q,0),  where  Q - Eqi,  qi is the  output  of the
ith  producer,  and  0 is  the  set  of factors  that  determine  exposure  to  world
markets. 3 This  set  includes  quantitative  restraints  (QRs),  tariffs,  and the
real  exchange  rate.  Finally,  define  Ci  - F + qic 1 to  be the  total  costs  of
producing  qi  borne  by the  ith plant  (i-l,n),  where  F and  ci  are  constants.
The  presence  of marginal  cost  heterogeneity  is  meant  to reflect  differences  in
managerial  abilities,  credit  market  access,  and  capital  stocks.4
As  is  well  known,  the  first-order  condition  for  profit  maximization
under  Cournot  competition  is:
(1)  P(Q,Q)  +  qiPQ(Q,O)  - ci  i  - l,n
Accordingly,  summing  equation  (1)  over  all  plants,  equilibrium  output  and
price  in this  market  depend  only  on the  sum  of marginal  costs  and  not  on the
distribution  of marginal  costs  across  plants  (e.g.,  Bergstrom  and  Varian,
1985):
(2) nP(Q,Q)  + QPQ(Q,O)  Ci4
Given  n, and  assuming  PQ  <  0, theae  is thus  a negative  monotonic  relationship
between  Nc 1 and  the  equilibrium  industry  outp'  t,  Q.  In  turn,  given  Q,  each
plant's  output  q1 is  determined  recursively  by equation  (1).
If  market  entry  and  exit  are  free,  the  number  of firms  is  endogenous.
To characterize  equilibrium  in  this  case,  we require  that  the  last  and  least
efficient  plant (plant  n) covers  costs,  and  that  all  potential  firms  not in
the  market  to anticipate  losses  upon  entry. Sorting  plants  in order  of
increasing  average  cost,  this  condition  amounts  to:
(3)  Cn+,/qu+l  >  P(Q,il)  >  Cn/qn
where  q 3,, is  the  output  level  the  the  n+lth  (potential)  plant  would  cAooze  if
it  were to  enter  the  market.
B.  Demand  Shifts  and  Rationalixation
We can  now  review  predictions  atout  the  link  between  demand  shifts  and
the  size  distribution  of  plants. Hereafter,  any  shift  that  induces  average
cost  reductions  through  plant  size  adjustments  will  be said  to  have
"tationalized"  industry. 5 In  our  framework  this  can  occur  two  ways --  either
by increasing  output  levels  overall  and  reducing  average  fixed  costs,  or by
shifting  market  shares  toward  large,  low  marginal  cost  plants  and  reducing
average  variable  costs, 6
To exposit  the  conditions  under  which  trade  liberalization  induces  such
shifts,  it is  convenient  to  assume  a linear  demand  schedule  with  both the
intercept  and  the  slope  dependent  upon trade  regime:5
(4)  P-a-  Q,
a *  a(a),  a  - (O).
Then,  if  entry  is  not  possible,  equilibrium  is  described  by the  following  n+2
conditions:
no - E  i
(5.2)  p  __a___c
(n+l)
(5.3)  qj  -a  +  Eci  - cj(n+l)  j-l,n.
P(n+l)
From  these  equations,  the  effect  of  demand  shifts  induced  by trade
reforms  follow  easily. Suppose  that,  beginning  from  autarky,  trade  is
liberalized.  This  type  of reform  has the  effect  of  placing  domestic  producers
in  large  world  markets,  where  there  are  many  other  oroducers  and  substitute
products. Regaraless  of  whether  the  domestic  product  is  exportable  or import-
competing,  one  would  expect  its  demand  elasticity  to rise. We . ;vte  the
consequences  of such  an elasticity  increase  by pivoting  the  demand  curve
through  the  pre-reform  equilibrium  point,  reducing  both  a and  0.  By equation
(5.2)  P  must fall,  so  Q must  rise,  and  industry-wide  average  fixed  costs  must
fall. The  ratio  qj/Q  does  not  depend  on 0; thus  if  a were  not  changing,  all
plants  would  expand  proportionately,  and  average  variable  costs  would  be
unaffected.  But  reductions  in  a dampen  the  expansion  of each  plant  by the
same  absolute  amount  (equation  5.3),  allowing  large  plants  to  expand  at Faster
rate. 5 So trade  reforms  that  increase  the  elasticity  of  demand  without6
shifting  it  inward  reduce  average  costs,  both  by shifting  production  toward
low  cost  producers  and  by increasing  industry-wide  output.
Of course  elasticity  effects  are  not  the  only  possible  effect  of
increased  foreign  competition.  Trade  reforms  that  amount  to tariff  reductions
or real  currency  appreciation  may  act  mainly  to  reduce  domestic  demand  for
import-competing  products.  If this  causes  a contraction  in total  output,
average  fixed  costs  will rise  for  the  affected  industries,  at least  partly
offsetting  any fall  in  average  variable  costs. Although  many  simulation
models  allow  for  this  contractionary  effect  of liberalization,  it  has  not
usually  proved  to  be dominant. 6
Now  consider  the  adjustments  that  occur  when entry  and  exit  are
possible. Suppose  trade  liberalization  shifts  demand  inwatd  (reduces  a),  with
or  without  an increase  in  elasticity.  By equation  5.2,  P must  fall,  so the
smallest,  least  efficient  firms  will  begin  to  take  losses  and  exit,  reducing
both  n and  Zci. 7 In the  initial  equilibrium  c,  < P (equation  3),  so  before
price  adjusts,  this  exit  will  have reduced  nP  more than  it  reduced  Zci.
Accordingly,  to restore  equilibrium  Q must  contract  more  and  P  must fall  less
than  they  would  have if  exit  were  not  possible  (equation  2).  In sum,
compared  to the  case  of no exit,  efficiency  effects  are  stronger  for  two
reasons: The  least  efficient  plants  leave  the  market  entirely,  and  remaining
plants  face  less  contractionary  pressure. By  analogous  logic,  free  entry  and
exit  exacerbate  the  reduction  in  productive  efficiency  associated  with  outward
shifts  of the  demand  curve,  as  might  accompany  quotas  or increases  ir  the
tariff  rate:  Small,  inefficient  firms  are  induced  to  enter  and  take  market
shares  from  incumbents.  This  consequence  of market  expansion  through
protection  is another  familiar  story  in the  literature. 87
C.  Robustness
Though  far  from  comprehensive,  the  expositLon  above  gives  an idea  of the
size  rationalization  effects  that  have  recently  been  stressed  in the
literature. In  particular,  exposure  to foreign  competition  can increase
plants'  size  by increasing  the  el.asticity  of  demand. Even  if  exposure  to
competition  reduces  plant  size  by contracting  demand,  it is  likely  to  hit the
most inefficient  plants  hardest. Hence,  unless  returns  to scale  are
important,  efficiency  gains  are  still  likely. Finally,  the  positive  effects
of liberalization  are larger  when  entry  and  exit  are  possible  because
inefficient  plants  will  be forced  out  of the  market,  allowing  those  producers
who  remain  behind  to.operate  on a larger  scale.
Although  these  effects  are  often  stressed,  they  '.re  not gauranteed.
There  is  no reason  why liberalizations  might  not  contract  demand  for  domestic
products  so severely  as to increase  average  costs  --  particularly  when fixed
costs  and  entry  barriers  are  significant.  Moreover,  as  various  authors  have
shown, alternative  analytical  frameworks  expand  the  range  of  possible
outcomes. For  example,  if static  Cournot  quantity  competition  is  replaced
with  another  equilibrium  concept,  firms  adjust  their  output  levels  differently
in  response  to demand  shifts. The  monotonic  ne.itive  relationship  between
plant  size  and  average  variable  costs  might  tt,en  be broken,  and  it  would  no
longer  necessarily  hold  that  shifting  producticn  toward  large  plants  improves
efficiency. Still  more  outcommes  are  possible  if one  endogenizes  marginal
costs,  allowing  for  changes  in factor  prices,  X-efficiency,  and  learning-by-
doing. Finally,  domestic  product  differentiation  can  be introduced.  This  not
only  opens  the  possibility  of  cross-plant  variation  in the  degree  ofa
competition  from  foreign  substitutes,  it  also  allow  endogenous  adjustments  in
the  length  of production  runs.
Given  these  qualifications,  it is  clearly  an empirical  question  whether
trade  liberalization  will:  (1)  increase  the  average  scale  of production;  (2)
shift  market  shares  toward  large  producers;  and (3)  bring  with it  productivity
improvement.  The remainder  of this  paper  is  devoted  to  ar econometric
examinination  of these  issues.
III.  EMPIRICAL  METHODOLOGY
A.  The Data  and  Country  Backgrounds
In this  section  we examine  cross-country  and inter-temporal  contrasts  in
trade  exposure,  plant  size  distributions,  and  labor  productivity  distributions
for  evidence  on the  empirical  relevance  of the  theoretical  effects  reviewed  in
Section  II.  To do this  we utilize  annual  census  data  covaring  all
manufacturing  plants  with  at least  10  workers  in  Colombia  and  Chile. 9 But
before turning to the empirical models these data support, it is useful to
review the cross-country differences and within-country time series
fluctuations in trade policies and industrial  performance that allow us to
identify  parameters.
Chilei°
The  Chilean  data  used  in this  paper  cover  the  period  1979-35;  we begin
our  overview  with the  years  immediately  preceding. like  much  of Latin
America,  Chile  pursued  an inward-oriented  development  strategy  in  the  1960s.
The  system  of incentives  --  including  tariffs,  quotas,  e:cchange  rate  policy,
and domestic market regulations --  favored  manufacturing at the expense of9
agriculture  and import-competinig  producers  over  exporters  (Corbo,  1985). This
bias int3nsified  in the  early  1970s. By 1973  average  cariff  rates  exceeded
100%,  prior  deposit  requirements  for  importers  created  heavy  additional
surcharges,  and  a complex  system  of  multiple  exchange  rates  prevailed.
In 1973,  the  military  seized  power  and  began  implementing  radical  policy
changes. In  addition  to fiscal  austerity  and  price  stabilization  programs,
the  new  government  rapidly  implemented  lajssez  faire  micro  reforms. The  new
administration  sold  public  enterprises,  decontrolled  prices  and interest
rates,  and  dismantled  trade  barriers. The  average  nominal  tariff  rate fell
from  105  percent  in 1974  to  12 percent  in 1979.
Although  the  industrial  sector  initially  suffered  from  recessionary
macro  conditins, recovery  began  in 1976  and  continued  into  1981.  Several
features  of this  recovery  were  noteworthy. First,  the  reductions  in
industrial  employment  that  accompanied  the  1974-75  recession  continued  during
the  1976-81.  ra_over,,  so that  labor  productivity  increased  dramatically.
Second,  the  balance  of trade  in  industrial  products  worsened  considerably
during  che  latter  part  of the  recovery  period. The trade  liberalization  was
partly  responsible.  but there  was  also  considerable  exchange  rate  appreciation
beginning  ill  1979. Third,  during  19'6-1981  a  handful  of powerful
conglomeratps  ("grupos")  emerged  and  consolidated  control  over  both financial
and  industrial  enterprises.
By the  end  of 1982,  the  Chilean  economy  was  again  in  serious  trouble.
The  exchange  rate  had  been  overvalued  for  some  time,  and  tradeable  sector
producers  had  undergone  a  protracted  profit  squeeze. Large  capital  inflows
were  necessary  tu  finance  the  current  account  deficit,  yet international
credit  was  evaporating,  exacerbating  firms'  financial  stress  with  very  high10
interest  rates. The  government  finally  devalued,  but the  financial  soundness
of the  economy  had  already  been  undermined,  and  a major  recession  followed.
Unemployment  reached  roughly  -O%  in 1983.
To  help the  economy  recover,  the  government  took  various  steps  to  ease
firms'  financial  problems. This relief,  in  addition  to devaluation,  a mild
increase  in tariff  protection,  and  a reduction  in  the  corporate  income  tax
from  38%  to 10%,  facilitated  a quick  industrial  sector  recovery. As the
recovery  continued,  average  tariff  levels  were  gradually  dropped,  falling  from
a  peak of 36%  in  September  1984  to 15%  in  1988.
To summarize,  our  sample  period  includes  the  end  of a  major  trade
liberalization  and  economic  recovery  (1979-81),  a severe  recession  that  was
accompanied  by devaluation  and  mild increases  in  protection  (1982-83),  and  a
sustained  recovery  with a return  to  very low  levels  of protection. Table  1
presents  time  series  on trade  exposure  and  average  workers  per  plant  (an  index
of average  plant  size). Note that  the  ratio  of imports  to  output  grew
substantially  over  the  period  1979-82,  then  fell  (with  devaluation  and
increased  protection)  after  1982. Both  total  manufacturing  employment  and
average  plant  size  declined  continuously  after  1979  until  the  recovery  began
iii  1984.
Popular  sentiment  has it that  the  Chilean  industrial  sector  is  now one
of the  most  efficient  in  Latin  America. Although  the  government's  approach  to
anti-trust  policy  is  essentially  laissez  faire,  it  is commonly  held that  the
discipline  of foreign  competition  prevents  firms  from  exercising  much  market
power  and  forces  inefficient  firms  to reform  or shut  down.  The  "grupos"  are
still  in  evidence,  but  they  too  are  considered  efficient  competitors  by most
observers.Colombia
The  Colombian  data  base  spans  1977-1987  but,  as with  Chile,  it  is
instructive  to  begin  with  a review  of  years  preceditng.  In 1967,  the  Colombian
government  began  to abandon  its  traditional  inward-looking  development
strategy  in  favor  of  export  promotion  policies,  a modest  degree  of trade
liberalization,  and  greater  exchange  rate  flexibility.  Exports  were
encouraged  with  duty  drawback  schemes,  tax  incentives,  and  special  credit
facilities. Imports  were liberalized  by scaling  back  prior  licensing
requirements,  eliminating  prohibited  lists,  anu  reducing  average  nominal
tariff  rates. 11
During  this  period  of export  promotion  and  trade  liberalization  there
was  growth  in  the  aggregate  economy  as  well as in the  volume  of imports  and
exports. Real  GDP  grew  at an annual  average  rate  of 6.3  percent  over  the
1967-75  period,  and  the  manufacturing  sector  grew  at  an annual  rate  of 8.8
percent. But  beginning  in late  1975,  significant  changes  in  Colombia's
macroeconomic  environmenc  began  to influence  trade  policy  and the  real
exchange  rate. Specifically,  substantial  increases  in  world  coffee  prices  and
increased  foreign  borrowing  contributed  to large  foreign  exchange  inflows
which  resulted  in increased  inflation.  Substantial  real  appreciation
resulted,  which  tended  to  hurt tradeable  goods  producers  in the  industrial
sector. Accordingly,  between  1976  and  the  early  1980s,  efforts  to  liberalize
the  trade  regime  proceeded  at a slower  pace.
The trend  toward  liberalization  stalled  completely  in  the  early  1980s.
In 1980,  approximately  69  percent  of  all  commodities  did  not  require  import
licenses. But  in 1981  only  36  percent  of all  commodities  were classified  in
the  free import  category,  and  this  percentage  fell  continuously  through  1984.12
By that  time  only .5  percent  of  all  commodities  could  be freely  imported,  83
percent  required  licenses,  and  16.5  percent  were  prohibited. Liberalization
resumed  in  1985  and 1986  but  not  enough  to return  to  1980  levels.
The  time  series  patterns  in  Colombian  trade  exposure  are reported  in
Table  1.  There  is  a marked  increase  in import  penetration  and  a marked
decline  in  export  shares  over  the  period  of  currency  appreciation,  1977-82.
Over  the  same  period,  total  manufacturing  employment  and  average  plant  size
declined. Finally,  note the  contrasts  between  Chile  and  Colombia  in terms  of
trade  exposure,  total  industrial  employment,  and  average  plant  size. Both the
total  manufacturing  sector  and  the  average  plant  size  are  larger  in  Colombia.
Moreover,  imports,  and to  a  lesser  degree  exports,  are  smaller  in  Colombia  as
a share  of domestic  production.  This  partly  reflects  differences  in  the  size
of the  two  countries  but  probably  also  reflects  Colombian  trade  policy,  which
never  came  close  to the  degree  of openness  found  in  Chile. 12 For  example,
while  Chile  essentially  eliminated  QRs, they  remained  a prominent  feature  of
Colombian  trade  policy  throughout  the  sample  period. Similarly,  while  Chile
had  achieved  uniform  10  percent  tariffs  by 1979,  Colombian  tariffs  remained
around  30  percent  after  substantial  cuts  in 1974.
B  An Empirical  Framework  for  Plant  Size  and  Productivity  Analysis
We wish to  develop  regressions  that  use trade  exposure  proxies  to
explain  variations  in  the  size  and  productivity  of  plants  across  3-digit
industries,  countries,  and  time. First,  to  summarize  plant  sizes  for industry
i,  country  J,  year  t,  we rank  plants  by ascending  employment  level  and  find
the  employment  cut-offs  for  the  10 h, 25th,  5 0th,  7 5th,  and  9 0th  percentiles.13
Similarly,  to  summarize  productivity  distributions  for  each  observation,  we13
rank  plants  by output  per  worker  and find  cut-offs  for  the  same  percentiles.
Hence  we generate  five  size  measures  and  five  productivity  measures,  each  of
which  can  serve  as a dependent  variable:
ln(EMPkijt)  - logarithm  of che  kth  percentile  of the  employment  size
distribution  (k  - 10,  25, 50,  75,  90)
ln(PRDkijt)  - logarithm  of the  the  kth  percentile  of the
productivity  (output  per  man)  distribution (k  - 10,
25,  50,  75,  90)
This  approach  not  only  allows  us to  study  variation  in  median  plant  sizes  and
median  labor  productivity  (i.e.,  changes in the  50th percentiles),  it  permits
us to analyse  changes  in  the  shape  of the  size  and  productivity  distributions,
picking  up such  things  as the  growth  or  disappearance  of very  small  plants.
We express  all  percentiles  in  logarithms  to facilitate  analysis  of their  rates
of change  and  the  associated  shifts  in  output  shares.
To  explain  distributional  shifts,  we regress  each  of the  ten  variables
above  on  proxies  for  various  types  of demand  shifts. For industry  i,  country
j,  year  t,  the  explanatory  variables  we work  with  are:
lnQijt  - log  of real  industry  output
ln(M/Q)ijt-  log  of the  ratio  of imports  to  output
ln(X/Q)  ijt-  log  of the  ratio  of exports  to  output
TURj  - mean  turnover  rate. The turnover  rate is  the  sum  of the
industry's  entry  and  exit  rates. These  rates  are  averaged
across  all  years  for  each  industry  in  each  country  to get  a
"long  run"  value  that  is  specific  to  each industry  in  each
country.14
ERPij  - log  of the  mean  effective  rate  of protection.  Given  that
Chilean  protection  was  essentially  uniform  during  the  sample
period,  variation  in  this  protection  measure  is due  only  to
Colombia. For  Chile,  we set  this  variable  to  0.  Colombian
figures  are  averages  of effective  protection  measures  for
1979,  1984  and 1985  reported  in  Cubillos  and  Torres  (1987).
Hence,  for  example,  one  possible  regression  explaining  the  kth  employment
percentile  is:
(7)  EMPkijt  - OllnQt  +  621n(M/Q)ijt  +  031n(X/Q)±jt  +  64TUR 1i  +  p5TURijlnQijt
+  06TURijln(M/Q)ijt  +  0 7 TURijln(X/Q)ijt  + A.  j +  pjt  +  jt
Here-  lnQ  proxies  total  market  size,  while  ln(X/Q)  and  ln(M/Q)  proxy  exposure
to international  markets. (When  interpreting  coefficients  on these  latter
variables,  it  must  be kept in  mind  that  the  regression  has already  controlled
for  total  output.) The  average  turnover  rate,  TUR, is  used  as a measure  of
the  extent,  and thus  the  ease,  of entry  and  exit  into  an industry  over  time.
High turnover  rates  are  consistent  with low  sunk  costs  of entry,  and  hence
should  reflect  the  potential  for  competitive  pressures  f;om  domestic  rivals.
Also,  as  discussed  in  section  II,  the  sensitlvity  of size  distributions  to
demand  shift  should  depend  upon the  ease  of entry  and  exi.. We therefore
interact  our  turnover  variable  with  the  trade  variables  in  the  regression
equations. Finally,  to  control  for  the industry-specific  technology  effects
and  country-specific  macro  conditions,  represented  by A and  j.  respectively,
industry  and  time  dummies  are  included.  14Equation  7  can,  of course,  also  be
estimated  using  productivity  percentiles,  PRDk,  as dependent  variables.
As seen  in  Table  1,  there  are  fairly  significant  and  persistent  cross-
country  differences  in trade  exposure  and  average  plant  size,  but  plant  sizel5
fluctuations  within  each  country  over  time  are  smaller. This  suggests  that
the  patterns  of correlation  will  depend  upon the  type  of estimator  applied  to
the  panel  data.  For  example  if  we use  a "between"  estimator,  parameters  are
identified  with  cross-country  differences  in  the (temporal)  mean  values  of the
variables. Averaging  Equation  7  across  time  gives: 15
(8)  EMPij - $lnQij + 621n(M/Q)ij  +  031n(X/Q)ij  +  04TURij  + 05TURijlnQij
+  0 6TURijln(M/Q)ij  +  0 7 TURijln(X/Q)ij  +  Ai  +  pj +  Cj
Parameter  estimates  of uj  in  this  model  will  reflect  country-wide
contrasts  between  the  Chilean  and  Colombian  size  distributions,  while  Ai
estimates  will reflect  technological  and  other  industry-specific  factors
common  to  both  countries  that  determine  the  size  distribution  for  industry
"i". The remaining  parameters  reflect  correlations  once these  factors  are
controlled  for. Because  variables  are  averaged  over  time,  the  estimates  might
be viewed  as reflecting  long-run  correlations.  16  To examine  the  robustness
of our findings to alternative  measures of trade exposure we will also
estimate the model using ERP rather than ln(X/Q) and ln(M/Q).
An alternative estimator of Equation 7 does not involve  averaging over
time.  Rather, it identifies  parameters  by treating a single industry, country
and year as the unit of observation.  If  we control for technology differences
with country-specific industry  dummies, and we control for macro effects with
country-specific time dummies, the resultant "within" estimates should reflect
the time series correlations of size or productivity distributions with16
industry-specific  trade  policy.  These  estimates  address the  question  of how
much rationalization  occurs  within  a  country  in  the  short  run  as trade
exposure  changes. They  will  be more sensitive  to  hysteresis  effects  than  the
"between"  estimates,  so  entry  and  exit  are  likely  to  play  a smaller  role in
the  short  run.  Bear  in  mind  also  that  this  estimator  will  not  pick  up the
dynamics  of adjustment  processes  --  all  correlations  are  contemporaneous.
Finally,  given  that  the  variable  ERP  does  not  vary through  time,  we are  unable
to  check  the  robustness  of our  "within"  regression  by replacing  ln(X/Q)  and
ln(M/Q)  with the  effective  rate  of protection.
IV.  RESULTS: BETWEEN  COUNTRY  ESTIMATES
A.  The  Employment  Size  Distribution
Table  2  presents  regression  coefficients  for  the  employment  size
distribution  using  the  "between"  estimator. Explanatory  variables  are listed
on the  left-hand  side  of the  table  and  percentiles  across  the  top.  Each
column  in  each  panel  summarizes  a separate  regression.  The top  panel  was
estimated  using  import  and  export  shares  as the  measure  of trade  exposure  and
the  bottom  panel  was  estimated  using  effective  rates  of  protection.  Note that
overall,  the  fit  is  very  tight,  and  both trade  patterns  and  turnover  appear  to
matter  a great  deal.  17
Looking  across  columns  in the  top  half  of  Table  2,  one  sees  that  an
increase  in import  share  is  associated  with  a reduction  in  all  size
percentiles,  controlling  for  the  level  of industry  output. These  results
suggest  that,  contrary  to  the  findings  of  many  simulation  models,  the
elasticity  effects  of import  competition  on plant  size  are  not  dominant.17
Rather,  demand  contraction,  factor  market  effects,  and  other  forces  associated
with increased  import  competition  apparently  lad  to smaller  plants.18  We
defer  the  issue  of  whether  this  means  efficiency  losses  accompany
liberalization  to section  IVC  below.
Notice  next  that  large  plants  appear  to contract  relatively  more in the
face  of import  competition,  so even  the  market  share  effects  of trade
liberalization  appear  to  be absent. This  result  is  not  as robust  as the
negative  correlation  between  trade  exposure  and  size,  as  will  be seen
presently. Nonetheless,  possible  explanations  are  worth  listing. First,
drawing  on the  simple  analytics  of section  III,  it is  possible  that  trade
exposure  actually  reduces  demand  elasticities.  Second,  and  more  plausibly,  it
may  be that  imported  goods  do  not  compete  with the  kinds  of goods  small  plants
produce,  so large  plants  bear  most  of the  adjustment  burden. Third,
industries  with large  plants  may  be  more  effective  at lobbying  for  import
protection.
The  coefficients  on the  interaction  between  TUR  and ln(M/Q)  are
significantly  positive,  which  implies  that  the  size  effect  of trade  exposure
is  more substantial  in  low  turnover  industries.  Given  that  import  expansion
is  associated  with  output  contraction,  this  is  consistent  with the  theory
reviewed  earlier: more  size  adjustment  occurs  when  exit  is  not  easy.
Alternatively,  the  results  might  be interpreted  to  mean  simply  that  the
discipline  of foreign  competition  matters  more  in industries  where  the
discipline  of potential  entry  is  less  important.  Here  again,  the  larger
effect  for  the  higher  percentiles  is supportive  of the  hypothesis  that  imports
compete  more  directly  with  big  plants. In  either  case,  the  data  confirm  the
arguments  of Buffie  and  Spiller  (1986),  Rodrik  (1988a),  and  others  that  it is18
critical  to take  ease  of  entry  into  consideration  when  predicting  the  effect
of regime  changes  on size  distributions.
Turni..g  next  to  export  shares,  one finds  the  direction  of the  r.ects  is
similar: high trade  exposure  is  associated  with smaller  plant  sizes,  and  the
effect  is  strongest  in industries  with low  turnover. This  pattern  is
generally  supportive  of the  premise  that  both  ln(X/Q)  and ln(M/Q)  measure
exposure  to foreign  markets. However,  the  effect  of ln(X/Q)  now  weakens  as we
move to  higher  percentiles,  so  most  of the  contrast  between  "open"  and
"closed"  markets  appears  to  be showing  up among  small  plants. This same
pattern  holds  for  the  interaction  between  ln(X/Q)  and  TUR.  We have  no ready
explanation  for  this  finding,  but it  may  indicate  that  small  plants  are
relatively  more important  export  suppliers.
Given  import  and  export  shares,  larger  industry-wide  output  levels  have
an effect  on the  size  distribution  that  is  qualitatively  identical  to that  of
trade  exposure. Larger  domestic  production  is  associated  with  relatively  more
small  producers,  especially  in low  turnover  industries.  We can  offer  several.
observations  on this  somewhat  surprising  result. First,  if larger  markets  are
more  competitive,  one  would  expect  to see  this  correspondence  between  plant
size  and  trade  exposure. Second,  it  must  be remembered  that  ln(Q)  enters  the
variables  ln(X/Q)  and  ln(M/Q)  negatively.  Hence,  the  total  effect  of an
increase  an output  holding  M and  X fixed  is  given  by the  sum  of the  output
coefficient  and  the  negative  of the  import  and  export  coefficients.  For
example,  a unit  increase  in  ln(Q)  holding  X and  M fixed  shifts  the  loth
percentile  rightward  by .184  +  .204  - .268  >  0.  The  negative  coefficient  on
output  in  the  regression  equations  implies  that  a proportionate  increase  in  Q,
X, and  M is  associated  with  a smaller  size  distribution  of plants.19
Since  industry  duimies  are  already  included,  the  level  of turnover  only
controls  for  country-specific  differences  in  turnover  rates. These  can  be due
to  cross-country  differences  in  product  mixes  within  given  industries,  or to
differences  in  credit  markets  and  other  determinants  of sunk  costs. 19 The
pattern  that  emerges  is  expected: high  turnover  is  associated  with  a
relatively  large  number  of small  plants.
To check  the  robustness  of the  findings  concerning  trade  exposure  and
plant  size,  we next  replace  the  trade  exposure  measures  ln(X/Q)  and ln(M/Q)
with the  effective  protection  measure  ERP. 20 The  coefficient  on ERP  in the
regressions  can  be interpreted  as the  difference  in  size  distributions  that is
correlated  with differences  in  effective  protection  rates,  controlling  for
country-wide  plant-size  differences,  and  for  indus  try  specific  effects.
Results  are  reported  in the  bottom  half  of Table  2.  Note first  that
there  is  a  positive  correlation  of the  employment  size  distributions  with
effective  protection. Just  as with  the  X/Q and  M/Q  measures  of trade
exposure,  higher  rates  of effective  protection  are  associated  with larger
plant  sizes. Moreover,  the  ize  effect  is less  extreme  in  high turnover
industries.  In  both these  senses  the  results  conform  to the  findings  in  the
top  half  of  Table  2:  demand  contraction  and  other  effects  associated  with
high trade  exposure  appear  to  dominate  elasticity  effects.
However,  comparing  the  different  size  percentiles,  one finds  that  the
statistically  significant  effects  of increased  protection  appear  in the  lower
percentiles,  which  suggests  that  small  plants  expand  at a relatively  rapid
rate  when  protection  is increased.  Contrary  to  our  earlier  findings,  these
results  are  consistent  with the  hypothesis  that  trade  exposure  increases20
demand  elasticities,  thereby  inducing  rationalization  by forcing  small  plants
to contract  relatively  more.
Finally,  in the  ERP  regressions  we see  that  larger  domestic  production
and  higher  turnover  are  both  associated  with rightward  shifts  in  the  size
distribution.  Both  of these  patterns  are  present  across  all  the  percentiles.
This  same  pattern  was reported  in  the  top  half  of  Table  2 for  the  75th and
goth  percentiles. However,  the  l0th  through  50th  percentiles  tended  to  decline
with increased  output  or turnover  in the  regressions  based  on ln(X/Q)  and
ln(M/Q). These  do not strike  us as important  anomalies  because,  as discussed
above,  the  size  shift  associated  with  output  increas6s  is  positive  for  all
table  2  percentiles  when  X and  H  are  held fixed. Also,  our turnover  variable
is  mainly  useful  in interaction  terms;  the  level  effects  of entry  barriers  are
essentially  controlled  for  with industry  duzmies.
To summarize  the  robustness  of the 'between'  estimates,  we conclude  that
the  correlation  between  trade  exposure  and  the  employment  size  distribution  is
clearly  negative  in  the  long  run,  and  the  magnitude  of the  effect  is  clearly
moderated  by ease  of  entry  or exit. 21 However,  whether  small  or large  plants
adjust  more in  percentage  terms  to increases  in  exposure  depends  upon the
measure  of exposure  that  is  used.  Perhaps  effective  protection  measures  are
most  relevant  for  policy  analysis  since  these  are  most  directly  controlled  by
the  government.
B.  Predicted  Employment  Size  Distribution  under  Alternative  Trade  Regimes
Given  that  the  regression  models  use interaction  terms  between  turnover
and trade  exposure,  it is  difficult  to infer  the  magnitudes  of  predicted
differences  in  the  employment  size  distribution  under  alternative  trade21
regimes. Accordingly,  Table  3  presents  predicted  values  of the  employment
size  distributions  based  on regression  results  from  Table  2.
The  top  panel  illustrates  how  the  employment  size  distribution  shifts  as
the  import  shars  rises,  the  middle  panel  illustrates  how it  shifts  as the
export  share  rises,  and the  bottom  panel  illustrates  .hifts  with  changes  in
effective  protection. The  left  size  vf the  table  describes  a low  turnover
industry  while  the  right  side  corresponds  to a  high turnover  industry.
Within  each  panel,  columns  present  "low",  "medium'  and "high"  export  or import
shares. 22 Finally,  rows  of the  table  give  predicted  employment  levels  for
the  5th  through  95th  percentiles,  as  well  as the  mean  and  standard  deviation
of the  employment  distribution.
First,  focussing  on the  size  distribution  for  low  turnover  industries,
the  leftward  shift  in  the  size  distribution  as import  shares  increase  is
marked. For  example,  the  mean  plant  size  falls  from  73.4  to 31.1  employees  as
the  import  share  rises. This leftward  shift  is  particularly  large  for  the
75th ,  90th, and  95th  percentiles.  Similarly,  both the  mean  and the  standard
deviation  drop substantially  with increases  in  import  share. Recall,  however,
that  high turnover  moderates  the  extent  to  which  import  shares  reduce  plant
size. This  appears  in  Table  3  when  one  moves  from  the  low  turnovter  to  the
high turnover  figures,  especially  among  large  plants.
Relative  to import  shares,  export  shares  appear  to  covary  less  with the
employment  size  distribution.  For  example,  among  low  turnover  industries,  the
mean  plant  size  declines  only  from  54.2  to 51.1  employees  as the  export  share
increases. Also,  although  plants  in  high turnover  industries  are  generally
more  concentrated  in  the  lower  employment  ranges,  changes  in  export  shares
appear  to  have little  effect  on location  or shape  of the  distribution.22
The  bottom  panel  of Table  3 reports  predicted  percentiles  of  the  size
distribution  when  the  effective  rate  of protection  is  varied. The  most
substantial  change  occurs  in the  upper  percentiles  of the  size  distribution
for  low  turnover  industries.  Increases  in the  effective  rate  of  protection
are  correlated  with  an increase  in  the  size  of the  larger  plants,  but the
increase  is  not  as  large  as  that  associated  with  changes  in  import
penetration.
C.  Distribution  of Labor  Productivity
The empirical  results  thus  far  have shown  that  high trade  exposure  is
associated  with relatively  small-scale  production,  controlling  for  other
factors. Does  this  mean  that  trade  exposure  worsens  productivity?  To
examine  this  issue  more  directly,  we next  apply  our  empirical  model  to the
distribution  of labor  productivity  across  plants. This  not  only  allows  us to
determine  the  overall  direction  of  productivity  shifts  with  trade  exposure,  it
also  speaks  to such  questions  as  whether  shifts  are  concentrated  among  the
least  productive  plants.
Table  4 reports  "between-country"  regression  results  fo-  the  percent.les
of the  labor  productivity  distribution.  The top  half  of the  table  measures
trade  exposure  with import  and  export  shares  while  the  bottom  half uses
effective  rates  of protection.  The first  result  to  notice  is  that
significance  levels  are  much  lower  than  those  associated  with size
distributions.  Hence  reductions  in labor  productivity  do not  obviously
accompany  reductions  in  scale. Notice  next  that  differences  in the  import
share  between  countries  are  positively  correlated  with differences  in the
percentiles  of the  productivity  distribution,  while  the  export  share  is23
negatively  correlated.  This  negative  correlation  of exports  ard  productivity
could  reelect  the  limitations  of single-factor  productivity  measures:  low
labor  productivity  may  be due to  high  labor  intensity  without  implying  low
total  factor  productivity,  since  capital  is  not  controlled  for. Moreover,  the
Hechscher-Ohlin  models  suggests  that  trade  liberalization  should  stimulate
exports  of labor-intensive  products,  so this  omitted  variable  bias in  our
productivity  measure  will  be correlated  with trade  patterns.
Larger  levels  of industry  output,  holding  import  and  export  shares
fixed,  are  correlated  with a rightward  shift  in  the  labor  productivity
distribution.  This  could  reflect  increased  capacity  utilization  or
exploitation  of  scale  economies  in  the  larger  country. High  turnover
industries  also  have  higher  productivity  levels. As was  seen  in the
employment  distributions,  high  turnover  tends  to  reduce  the  magnitude  of the
import,  export  and  output  correlations.  Finally,  the  country  dummy  variable
is  positive  and  significant.  This  can  simply  reflect  differences  in  the  units
of measurement.  However,  with the  exception  of the  country  dummy  and  output
level  among  higher  productivity  plants, virtually  none  of the  remaining
coefficients  are  statistically  significant.  Unlike  the  employment  size
distribution,  there  is little  evidence  here  that  productivity  differences
across  the  two  countries  are  related  to  trade  exposure.
The  bottom  half  of Table  4 reports  regression  results  using  the
effective  rate  of  protection  as the  measure  of trade  exposure. Again,  output
and turnover  are  correlated  with  a rightward  shift  in the  productivity
distribution.  Increased  trade  protection  is  correlated  with  higher
productivity,  especially  for  the  least  productive  plants,  but  once  again,  none
of these  coefficients  are  statistically  significant. In  short,  based  on our24
(admittedly  crude)  measure  of productivity,  there  is  no clear  evidence  that
differences  in trade  expo;ure  between  sectors  in  Cclombia  and  Chile  are
correlatea  with  differences  in the  distribution  of plant-level  labor
productivity.
V.  RESULTS: WITHIN  COUNTRY  ESTIMATES
As reviewed  in  section  III,  an alternative  way to identify  our  model  is
to  use the  within-country  temporal  variation  in  the  data.  This  approach  picks
up the  short-run  associations  between  trade  exposure,  output  levels,  and the
size  and  productivity  distributions.  The top  panel  of Table  5  presents
results  for  the  employment  size  distribution  and  the  lower  panel  presents
results  for  the  productivity  distribution.
A.  Employment  Size  Distribution
Fluctuations  in import  shares  show  ,.  negative  association  with  plant
sizes,  just  as in  all  the  "between"  country  regressions.  Now,  however,  this
association  is  so weak  statistically  that  it  makes  li:tle  sense  to talk  of
short-run  rationalization  effects. Because  we are limitinY  the  "within"  model
to contemporaneous  effects,  we find  this  low  significance  unsurprising.
More surprisingly,  time  series  fluctuations  in  export  shares  correlate
positively  with  the  percentiles  of the  size  distribution,  although  they  are
negatively  correlated  with  percentiles  in  the  "between"  regressions.  Though
weaker  than  in  Table  2, these  correlations  are  still  statistically
significant.  So in  the  short  run,  output  growth  due  to  export  share  expansion
is  associated  with  relatively  rapid  employment  growth. In terms  of
rationalization,  the  growth  in  employment  is  concentrated  among  large  plants.25
We see no obvious explanation for this  contrast between the "within' and the
"between"  results.
The coefficients on the output variable indicates that the correlation
of industrial output with plant sizes is generally positive.  This reflects a
combination of output adjustments by incumbencs  and entry or exit.  However,
given that most turnover takes  place among small plants, shifts in the  higher
percentiles reflect mainly the expansion and contraction of incumbents
(Roberts, 1989; Tybout, 1989).  Finally, in industries  where turnover is high,
the positive correlation between output and size is relatively muted.
Overall, the patterns of contemporaneous  correlation between the
percentiles of the employment size distribution  are much less systematic than
the between country estimates.  Systematic rightward or leftward movements of
the size distribution are not obvious in the regression results.  This
suggests that while the across-country  differences in trade exposure are
correlated with differences in t.he  entire size distribution of plancs, the
time-series differences in trade appear to have a more random effect on plants
within the size distribution.  This may mean that  differences in the plant
size distribution  between the countries reflect underlying structural
differences in the size of markets, openness to trade and other factors.  In
contrast time series fluctuations in the size distribution within each
industry and country reflect idiosyncratic  aspects of the market and time
period.
B.  Labor Productivity Distribution
The bottom half of Table 5 reports results for the labor productivity
distribution using the within-country  variation.  Import  share has no26
significant  effect  on the  shape  of the  distribution.  In  contrast,  an increase
in the  export  share  is  positively  and  significantly  correlated  with  the  10Th,
25th,  and  50th  percentiles  of the  productivity  distribution  but  negatively
correlated  with the  7 5 th  and  90th  percentiles.  That  is,  higher  export  shares
are  correlated  with  higher  productivity  for  the  less  productive  plants  but
lower  productivity  for  high  productivity  plants.
Expansion  in  output  over  time  leads  to  productivity  improvements.  This
can  result  from  either  increased  use  of  capital  or scale  economies  in  high
output  periods. Finally,  as  we have  seen  throughout  this  paper,  the  import,
export,  and  output  correlations  are  lower  in  magnitude  in  high turnover
industries.  In  particular,  the  turnover  results  could  arise  if  high turnover
industries  are  less  capital  intensive  or  have technologies  with less  scale
economies. Demand  fluctuations  in  these  industries  then  have less  effect  on
an individual  plant's  labor  productivity  and  thus  less  effect  on the
distribution  across  plants.
Overall,  the  within  estimator  indicates  little  evidence  of
rationalization  with  variation  in trade  exposure  over  time. The  productivity
changes  over time  are  largely  explainable  with  variation  in  capital
utilization.
VI.  SUHKARY
It is  often  argued  that  when  domestic  markets  are imperfectly
competitive,  increased  exposure  to  global  markets  should  rationalize
production. Such  exposure  is  believed  to increase  the  elasticity  of demand
perceived  by domestic  producers,  which  in turn  should  shift  production  toward
the  large,  efficient  plants. The  rationalization  effects  should  be  especially27
marked when there are low barriers to entry and exit because inefficiently
small plants will be induced to shut dowr.. This paper is the first attempt we
know of to confront these :heories of rationalization  with actual data on the
size distribution of plants from developing countries.
Several striking results emerge.  First, increased exposure to import
competition appears to clearly reduce the size of all plants in  both the short
run and the long run, but especially in the latter.  Whether large plants
shrink relatively less depends upon the  way in which we measure exposure to
world markets:  Increases in import shares are associated with relatively
rapid shrinkage by large plants, but reductions in effective protection
correlate with relatively little shrinkage by large plants.  Either way, it
appears that models that predict trade liberalization  will increase average
plant size in import-competing  sectors do not describe recent Chilean and
Colombian experiences.  This may mean that productivity improvements have not
accompanied liberalization,  but our findings on this issue  are not strong
enough to warrant strong conclusions.
Second, as theory suggests, it makes a great deal of difference whether
one is analyzing industries  with high or low entry barriers.  The effects of
changing output levels, import shares,  export shares, and effective protection
rates are systematically  moderated by the possibility of easy entry or exit.
One interpretation is that there is less role for output adjustment by
incumbent  plants when the  number of plants adjusts to demand shifts.
Alternatively  our results could simply mean that  high turnover reflects
coraipetitive  pressure, and reduces the marginal impact  of foreign competition
on market structure.28
Third,  the  "long-run"  correlations  of trade  regimes  and  size
distributions  are  quite  different  from  the  short-run  year-to-year
correlations.  Not  only  are  the  effects  of trade  exposure  stronger  in  the  long
run,  but the  correlations  of  export  shares  change  sign. The  short  run
correlations  show  exports  associated  with relatively  large  plants  while  the
long  run  correlations  show  exports  associated  with relatively  small  plants.
We trust  the  long  run  figures  more,  because  we limited  our short-run  analysis
to  simultaneous  correlations,  and  have  not  attempted  to  model  the  dynamics  of
adjustment.  Nonetheless,  the  short  run  findings  suggest  caution  in  extracting
policy  recommendations  from  our  figures.
This  paper  is  a first  step  in  the  direction  of micro-based  examinations
of the  rationalization  hypothesis.  Though  suggestive,  much  remains  to  be
done. Aside  from  modeling  the  dynamics  of adjustment,  we hope to study  the
relationship  between  average  costs  and  size,  and  the  degree  to  which  plants
adjust  costs  endogenously  with  changes  in  the  trade  regime.29
TABLE  1
TRADE  EXPOSURE  AND  MARKET  SIZE IN COLOMBIA  AND  CHILE
XYar  ImRort  Share  a  Export  Share  b  Total Emolov.c  Plant  Size  d
Colomki  Chile  Colombia  Chile  Colombia  Chile  Colombia  Chile
1977  .246  .100  402.7  77.0
1978  .262  .088  410.7  79.0
1979  .250  .528  .092  .086  420.8  229.0  78.7  55.6
1980  .328  .600  .108  .105  419.8  209.8  77.2  56.4
1981  .363  .762  .055  .060  404.3  194.2  75.0  57.5
1982  .375  .758  .053  .088  394.2  155.2  69.9  51.3
1983  .329  .637  .047  .088  374.5  147.3  74.6  52.9
1984  .297  .762  .047  .081  372.6  164.2  74.4  56.6
1985  .264  .701  .051  .072  360.0  174.2  69.7  60.9
1986  .289  .061  368.6  68.5
1987  .287  .065  397.5  71.0
Ave.  .299  .678  .070  .083  393.2  182.0  74.1  55.9
a Manufactured  imports  as  a share  of domestic  manufactured  output
b  Marnfactured  exports  as  a share  of domestic  manufactured  output
i'otal  manufacturing  employment,  in  thousands
Average  number  of  workers  per  plant  in  the  manufacturing  sector30
TABLE  2
BETWEEN  ESTIMATES  OF EMPLOYMENT  SIZE  DISTRIBUTION  £
(Absolute  values  of t-statistics  in  parenthesis)
Trade  ErDosure  Measured  with Imgort  and  Export  Shares
Percentile
10th  25th  50th  75th  90th
ln(M/Q)  -. 184*  -. 317*  -. 432  -.5/3*  -1.10*
(2.59)  (2.78)  (2.03)  (2.24)  (2.98)
ln(X/Q)  -. 204*  -. 333*  -.367*  -. 168  .004
(6.24)  (6.36)  (3.76)  (1.43)  (.022)
ln(Q)  -. 268*  -.496*  -. 414*  .251  .129
(3.81)  (4.40)  (1.97)  (1.00)  (.353)
TUR  -7.60*  -14.17*  -10.02  13.43  14.72
(3.31)  (3.86)  (1.46)  (1.63)  (1.23)
TR*ln(M/Q)  .446*  .663*  1.11*  1.39*  2.72*
(3.04)  (2.82)  (2.31)  (2.64)  (3.56)
TUR*ln(X/Q)  .772*  1.29*  1.51*  .695  .188
- (5.43)  (5.67)  (3.54)  (1.36)  (.254)
TUR*ln(Q)  .691*  1.21*  .974*  -.564  -. 722
(4.65)  (5.09)  (2.19)  (1.06)  (.935)
Chile  Dummy  -. 019  .055  -. 039  -. 291  -. 037
(.260)  (.473)  (.179)  (1.12)  (.097)
R2 .887  .903  .842  .866  .765
Trade  Exposure  Measured  with  Effective  Protection  Rates
Percentile
10th  25th  50th  75th  90th
ERP  .244*  .352*  .361  .332  .368
(3.41)  (2.52)  (1.78)  (1.j7)  (1.36)
ln(Q)  .296*  .422  .545  1.15*  1.24*
(2.39)  (1.78)  (1.58)  (4.03)  (2.70)
TUR  14.05*  19.08  21.96  43.73*  45.28
(2.33)  (1.64)  (1.31)  (3.13)  (2.03)
TUR*ERP  -. 707*  -1.05*  -1.01*  -1.04*  -1.11
(4.45)  (3.43)  (2.29)  (2.84)  (1.89)
TUR*ln(Q)  -. 876*  .1.18  -1.41  -2.67*  -2.73
(2.29)  (1.62)  (1.32)  (3.03)  (1.93)
Chile  Dummy  .003  -. 038  -. 113  -. 517  -. 474
(.014)  (.097)  (.198)  (1.09)  (.623)
R2 .664  .587  .596  .836  .647
aIndustry  dummies  were included  in  the  regressions  but  are  not reported.
*Significantly  different  from  zero  at the .05  level  using  a two-tail  test.31
TABLE 3
PREDICTED EMPLOYMENT  SIZE  DISTRIBUTION UNDER
ALTERNATIVE  LEVELS OF TRADE EXPOSURE
(Table entries are number of employees in kth  percentile plant)
Low Turnover Industries  High Turnover Industries
Import Share  Import Share
Percentile  low  moderate  high  low  moderate  high
5th  10.6  10.1  9.4  9.6  9.6  9.5
10th  11.7  10.9  9.8  10.8  10.5  10.1
25th  16.7  14.5  11.6  13.9  12.9  11.5
50th  31.9  26.8  20.5  23.0  21.5  19.4
75th  73.6  59.0  42.1  61.4  57.0  50.8
90th  199.2  131.0  69.2  110.8  97.0  79.3
95th  276.8  188.2  104.6  222.4  108.3  146.1
Mean  73.4  52.1  31.1  56.7  48.0  37.3
Std. Dev.  93.0  61.1  32.2  87.1  65.7  42.7
Lov Turnover Industries  Hish Turnover Industries
Ex2ort Share  ExRort Share
Percentile.  low  moderate  high  low  moderate  high
5th  10.2  10.1  10.1  9.2  9.6  9.7
10th  11.2  10.9  10.8  9.8  10.5  10.9
25th  15.0  14.5  14.2  11.5  12.9  13.7
50th  27.3  26.8  26.5  18.3  21.5  23.3
75th  59.4  59.0  58.7  52.8  57.0  59.2
90th  124.9  131.0  134.1  90.5  97.0  100.6
95th  200.2  188.2  182.4  188.2  188.3  188.3
Mean  54.2  52.1  51.1  47.3  48.0  48.4
Std. Dev.  66.7  61.1  58.4  70.9  65.7  63.2
Low Turnover Industries  High Turnover Industries
Effective Rate of Protection  Effective  Rate of Protection
Percentile  low  moderate  high  low  moderate  high
5th  11.7  11.8  11.9  10.2  10.2  10.2
10th  14.2  14.5  14.7  11.3  11.3  11.3
25th  21.2  21.7  22.2  15.1  15.1  15.1
50th  41.1  42.3  43.4  28.2  28.3  28.3
75th  79.7  81.4  82.9  70.1  69.6  69.1
90th  173.3  177.7  182.0  159.7  159.0  158.4
95th  324.3  339.2  354.1  278.6  281.2  283.7
Mean  76.3  78.6  80.9  67.7  67.9  68.1
Std.  Dev.  86.3  88.9  91.4  95.8  96.8  97.732
TABLE  4
BETWEEN  ESTIMATES  OF LABOR  PRODUCTIVITY  DISTRIBUTIONa
(Absolute  values  of t-statistics  in  parentheses)
Trade  EXDosure  Measured  with  Import  and  Exgort  Shares
Percentile
10th  25th  50th  75th  90th
ln(M/Q)  .158  .239  .230  .289  .398
(.474)  (.898)  (.890)  (1.08)  (1.58)
ln(X/Q)  -.271  -.258*  -.089  - .(45  -.186
(1.81)  (2.16)  (.764)  (.i72)  (1.64)
ln(Q)  .260  .387  .490  .643*  .619*
(.775)  (1.44)  (1.88)  (2.38)  (2.44)
TUR  8.26  8.81  7.26  9.27  6.46
(.754)  (1.01)  (.854)  (1.05)  (.780)
TUR*ln(M/Q)  -.389  -.592  -.644  - 667  -.824
--  _____  (.550)  (1.05)  (1.18)  (1.17)  (1.54)
TUR*ln(X/Q)  .910*  .806  .107  -. 064  .513
(1.40)  (1.55)  (.213)  (.122)  (1.04)
TUR*ln(Q)  -.495  -.516  -.547  -.618  -.312
(.708)  (.926)  (1.01)  (1.10)  (.589)
Chile  Dummy  1.91*  1.88*  1.85*  1.72*  1.55*
(5.65)  (7.00)  (7.09)  (6.32)  (6.06)
R2 .963  .978  .981  .980  .983
Trade  Exposure  Measured  with  Effective  Protection  Rates
Percentile
10th  25th  50th  75th  90th
ERP  .392  .296  .161  .143  .204
(2.04)  (1.73)  (1.01)  (.851)  (1.21)
ln(Q)  .788*  .715*  .493  .479  .552
(2.46)  (2.50)  (1.86)  (1.71)  (1.96)
TUR  36.08*  28.30  11.44  8.44  12.05
(2.31)  (2.03)  (.884)  (.618)  (.879)
TUR*ERP  -.872  -.588  -.031  .104  -. 147
(2.07)  (1.56)  (.089)  (.281)  (.399)
TUR*ln(Q)  -2.49*  -1.97*  -.880  -.628  -.868
(2.51)  (2.24)  (1.08)  (.726)  (1.00)
Chile  Dummy  2.51*  2.48*  2.52*  2.56*  2.45*
(4.65)  (5.13)  (5.63)  (5.43)  (5.18)
R2  .967  .976  .981  .980  .979
a  Industry  dummies  were included  in the  regressions  but  are  not  reported.
^Significantly  different  from  zero  at the .05  level  using  a two-tail  test.33
TABLE 5
WITHIN ESTIMATES OF EMPLOYMENT SIZE and PRODUCTIVITY DISTRIBUTIONa
(Absolute  values of t-statistics in parenthesis)
Emgloyment Size Distribution
Percentile
10th  25th  50th  75th  90th
ln(M/Q)  -. 048  .010  -.168*  -.115  -.120
(.812)  (.144)  (2.06)  (1.03)  (1.09)
ln(X/Q)  .035*  .007  -.042*  .071*  .061*
(2.35)  (.417)  (2.04)  (2.57)  (2.19)
ln(Q)  .163  .270*  .165  .349  .624*
(1.58)  (2.27)  (1.17)  (1.82)  (3.26)
TUR*ln(M/Q)  .226  -. 047  .463  .195  .178
(1.19)  (.215)  (1.77)  (.551)  (.502)
TUR*ln(X/Q)  -. 091  -.026  .146*  -.243*  -.214
(1.83)  (.452)  (2.12)  (2.61)  (2.30)
TUR*ln(Q)  -.577  -.776*  -. 306  -.784  -1.25*
(1.76)  (2.05)  (.679)  (1.29)  (2.07)
R2  .805  .902  .932  .925  .936
Labor Productivity Distribution
Percentile
10th  25th  50th  75th  90th
ln(M/Q)  .007  -.066  -.011  -.046  .044
(.066)  (.712)  (.120)  (.520)  (.432)
ln(X/Q)  .053  .076*  .069*  -. 056*  .055*
(1.89)  (3.25)  (2.95)  (2.55)  (2.12)
ln(Q)  .714*  .686*  .982*  .896*  1.29*
(3.68)  (4.26)  (6.07)  (5.89)  (7.25)
TUR*ln(M/Q)  - .003  .182  .067  .280  -. 017
(.008)  (.612)  (.225)  (.995)  (.052)
TUR*ln(X/Q)  -.101  -.187*  -.187*  .258*  .149
(1.07)  (2.39)  (2.38)  (3.50)  (1.73)
TUR*lrL(Q)  -.890  -.837  -1.85*  -1.55*  -2.93*
(1.44)  (1.63)  (3.59)  (3.21)  (5.18)
R2  .986  .991  .992  .993  .990
'Separate industry duzmies and time dummies for each country were included in
the regressions but are not reported.
*Significantly  different from zero and the .05  level using a two-tail test.34
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FOOTNOTES
1. Pack  (1989)  writes: "Comparisons  of total  factor  productivicy  growth  among
'.ountries  pursuing  different  international  trade  orientations  do not  reveal
systematic  differences  in  productivity  growth  in  manufacturing,  nor  do the
time-series  studies  of individual  countries  that  have experienced  alternating
trade  regimes  alllow  strong  conclusions  in this  dimension.  . . Moreover,  the
firm-level  data  collected  for  estimation  of production  frontiers  are  quite
reliable  and  confirm  the  pattern  established  at  more  aggregated  levels."
2. Buffie  and  Spiller  (1986),  Dixit  and  Norman  (1980),  Dutz (1990),  Lancaster
(1984), Helpman  and  Krugman  (1985),  Horstmann  and  Markusen  (1986),  and
Markusen  (1981)  are  among  the  many  relevant  references  in the  analytical
literature.  Simulation  results  that  reflect  at least  some  of the  effects
described  here include  Harris  (1984),  Rodrik  (1988),  Devarajan  and  Rodrik
(1989a,  1989b),  Condon  and  de Melo (1990),  de  Melo  and  Roland-Holst
(forthcoming),  and  de  Melo  and  Tarr (forthcoming). If  there  is  a novelty  to
our  model,  it is that  we simultaneously  treat  cost  heterogeneity  and
entry/exit  effects.
3. Domestic  markets  are  small  relative  to the  rest  of the  world,  and  foreign
producers  do not  react  strategically  to  domestic  producers'  behavior.
4. Most  models  in  the  trade  literature  do not  allow  for  marginal  cost
heterogeneity;  we include  it  here  to  captuire  the  spirit  of  X-efficiency
arguemnts  found  in  the  development  literature.
5.  We do not  believe  the  link  between  size  and  efficiency  is  well  established
in  the  empirical  literature  on developing  countries. However,  as this  link  is
assumed  in  most  analytical  and  simulation  models,  we assume  it  holds  here to
demonstrate  how these  models  work.
5.  More  precisely,  market  share  expands  with  a for  the  ith  firm  if  ci is
greater  than  Eci/n.
6. An exception  is de  Melo  and  Tarr (forthcoming)
7.  To see  this,  note  that  the  demand  function  (4)  and  the  profit  maximizacion38
condition  (1)  imply  qj  - (P-cj)/,,  J-1,  n.  If P falls,  qi  must  fall,  and  so
average  costs  at the  ith  plant  must  rise.
8.  Althiough  their  models  are  different,  the  same  conclusions  are  stressed  in
Eastman  and  Stykolt  (1966),  Dixit  and  Norman  (1980)  and  Harris  (1984),
9.  The  governments  of Chile  and  Colombia  have  recentlv  made these  data
avail  ble to  the  World  Bank  in  connection  with the  World  Bank  research  project
"Industrial  Competition,  Productive  Efficiency,  and  Their  Relation  to Trade
Regimes,"  RPO  674-46. They  are  described  in  Roberts  (1989)  and  Tybout  (1989).
10.  The following  discussion  of  Chile  is  based  on Tybout  (1989)  and  the
discussion  of  Colombia  is  based  on Roberts  (1989).
11.  In  1971  approximately  3  percent  of all  commodities  could  be freely
imported,  81  percent  required  licenses,  and  the  remaining  16  percent  were
prohibited. By 1974  approximately  30  percent  of all  commodities  on the  tariff
schedule  could  be freely  imported  and  the  remaining  70  percent  required  prior
licensing  (Garcia,  1988,  Table  2.1). Also,  nominal  tariff  rates  had fallen  to
an average  of 32  percent.
12.Colombian  per  capita  income  is  a  bit lower  than  that  of Chile,  but it  has
more than  double  Chile's  population.
13.  Because  of  various  data  problems,  the  manufacturing  industries  311,  312,
314,  353,  354,  361,  372,  and  385  are  not included  in the  analysis.
14.  Because  the  turnover  rate  we construct  has  no time  variation,  the
coefficient  04 cannot  be identified  separately  from 'ij  Thus  no  4values
are  reported  with  equtation  7  estimates.
15.  Here  it is  not  possible  to identify  separate  country  effects  for  each
indu'stry  because  observations  have  been  averaged  over  time. Hence  the
industry  dummies  do not  have  a "j"  subscript.
16  Recall,  however,  that  the  sample  countries  underwent  significant  changes
in trade  orientation  from  the  pre-sample  to the  sample  years;  so if  adjustment
is  slow,  even  the  "between"  estimates  may  not  reflect  steady  states.
17.  Interestingly,  the  couintry  dummy  is insignificant  in the  employment
regressions,  suggesting  that  any  cross-country  contrast  in the  size
distribution  is  associated  with  contrasts  in  the  explanatory  variables.
(Country  dummies  in  the  output  .egressions  pick  up units  of  measurement.)39
However, we caution that this estimator is  based on only 15 degrees of freedom
(21 3-digit industries in each country).
18.  Baldwin and Gorecki (1983) found similar effects in Canadian data,
although they did not stress them in their analysis.
19.Recall that Chile underwent a major financial crisis and restructuring in
the early 1980s.
20.We also repeated these regressions using real output, rather than
employment, as the measure of plant size.  The qualitative results are very
similar for the two measures.  Overall, shifts toward smaller plants are
associated with high trade exposure, especially in lGw turnover industries.
In  the output size distribution,  however, only the effect of export share was
consistently signif,cant.
21. Similar results  were obtained when plant-level output was used as a size
measure instead of employment.  These are available upon request.
22.The "low turnover"  predictions assume the turnover rate associated  with the
25th percentile of the turnover distribution, and "high turnover" predictions
assume the turnover rate of the 75th percentile.  Low, medium, and high trade
exposure measures, correspond to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of their
respective distributions.PRE  Working  PaaLr  Sarias
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